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Abstract 
This paper carries out both exploratory and empirical examinations of life insurance, financial literacy and 
corruption as probable antidote for economic inclusive challenges in the Nigerian growth project.  A review of 
Nigeria’s corruption indexes (Ci) ratings give the perception that Nigerians are endemically corrupt, greedy, 
avaricious, and valueless. Though, highly contestable; this study hypotheses that Ci ‘granger causes’ life 
insurance penetration (LIP),income inequality (proxied by Gini coefficient), financial literacy (Flt)(proxied by 
Literacy rate), Regulatory quality (Rqt), and gross domestic product growth rate (Gdpgr). The study finds 
significantly that Ci actually granger causes Gini, Flt and Gdpgr; also Rqt granger causes Lip. The major 
findings of the variance decomposition is that the predominant source of fluctuations in  all the ‘economic 
inclusions’ variables tested is income inequality, absorbing average of 85 percent of each through the short to 
long run periods.  However, this study could not establish Lip led Ci, in their nexus, as postulated by literature. 
The study recommends fiscal measures to tackle income inequality, raise the income tax rate of the rich, 
focusing more on indirect taxes on luxuries, and eliminate all taxes for the poor. Institutional regulatory lapse in 
the insurance industry should better addressed by appointing tested technocrats.           
 
Key words: Economics of corruption, Financial literacy, Insurance culture   
1.0 Introduction 
Corruption is not peculiar to Africa; it exists all over the world (Glynn et al, 1997). However, petty corruption 
seems to pervade developing economies with Nigeria ranking among the most corrupt nations (see figure 1 
below).  Insurance consumption or insurance culture, which this paper advances as market instrument for 
economic inclusion, is simultaneously low in Nigeria (see figure 1 below). Is there any causal linkage? Shabbir 
and Anwar (2007) citing World Bank source asserts that corruption is the single greatest obstacle to economic 
and social development. It undermines development by distorting the role of law and weakening the institutional 
foundation on which economic growth depends. 
 The study is partly motivated to explore further this ‘weakening of institutional foundations’ particularly 
insurance culture and more so that Transparency International (TI) declared Nigeria most corrupt nation, 1996, 
1997 and 2000 (Shabbir and Anwar, 2008).  But the architecture or economics of corruption could be more 
aggravated if the institutional frameworks to tackle its risks are non-functional due to financial knowledge of its 
basis of existence. The noise of corruption woes in Nigeria rents the air and a topical hot issue from the current 
political competition- model of President Mohammadu Buhari (PMB). The solution being proffered is explicably 
political and legal by disgorging ill-gotten wealth and possibly meting out punishment from the weak penal 
codes. Corruption is clandestine and needs more of economic and financial inclusion solutions. Unfortunately, 
Ades and Di Tella (1997) note that even economists remain vague about how best to reduce corruption citing 
lack of evidence for policy alternatives. Corruption causes everything like cancer in the human body 
(Amundsen,1999 cited in Shabbir and Anwar, 2008); from economic inefficiency (Sharkar and Hassan, 2001),  
distorting competition (IAIS, 2014), poverty, income inequality and indeed, the hypothesized poor demand of 
life insurance, health  insurance and private pensions may have causal relationship to it. The most inimical 
investment behavior of corruption as perceived in Osoba (1996) is the private accumulation of wealth function it 
assumes in Nigerian social life. This may have obfuscated the financial institutional functions of life and pension 
insurance. Life insurance penetration in Nigeria on the average in the last thirty years has not exceeded 0.6 
percent. It is one of the worst in the world and insignificant in African ranking. 
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Table1 shows 2013 stylized facts of life insurance consumption (life insurance penetration) and Corruption 
perception Index (CPI) of Nigeria and selected African and Global Peers. 
 
 
Table 1: 2013 Life insurance penetration in Nigeria and select African countries and the world   
Countries Population 
(′mill.)/rank 
Life 
Premium($′m) 
LIP CPI 
Score  
CPI 
Rank  
Nigeria 173.6/7th 457 0.0009 25 144th 
South 
Africa 
52.9/27th 44,556 0.127 42 72nd 
Egypt 82.0/15th 1,051 0.004 32 114th 
Kenya 44.3/30th 520 0.009 27 136th 
Chile 17.6/64th 6,986 0.025 71 22nd 
Singapore 5.3 15,092 0.05 86 5th 
S. Korea 50.2/26th 91,204 0.07 55 46th 
Japan 127.3/10th 422,733 0.086 74 18th 
Brazil 200.3/5th 49,417 0.02 42 72nd 
China 1,357.4/1st 152,121 0.016 40 80th 
India 1,252.1/2nd 52,174 0.027 36 94th 
United 
States 
316.1/3rd 532,858 0.03 73 19th 
Source: Life Insurance Information is from: 2015 International-Insurance-fact-book: 
www.iii.org/publication/international-insurance-fact-book-2015/worldoverview; Population: 2014 World-
Bank/indicator/N.E.GDI.TOTL.Zs, data.worldbank.org/, accessed February 15th, 2015; Life Insurance 
Penetration (LIP) is Authors’ computation. Corruption Perception Index: Transparency International 
https://www.transperency.org/cpi2013, accessed Sept. 9, 2015 
Figure 1 presents the glaring position of Nigeria as least life insurance penetrated economy and the most corrupt 
of the peers.    
There are very few empirical researches on the relationship of corruption with private insurance market 
development or culture, a gap that is conceived to be filled in this study.  Also, this paper aims to unearth the 
non-functionality of the insurance institution as a risk management tool against petty corruption with the 
incidence of financial illiteracy. The critical questions are therefore: Why is corruption a rapidly growing 
informal institution in Nigeria? Why is petty (quiet) corruption prevalent in Nigeria?  Why would there be 
relationship between corruption syndrome and life insurance penetration?  Why is insurance culture and 
financial illiteracy a prevention mechanism against petty corruption and low economic inclusion? The rest of the 
sections are arranged as follows: Literature review and theoretical framework; Methodology and Data; Results 
and Discussion of findings; Recommendations and Conclusion.  
2. Theoretical Framework  
Corruption is multi-dimensional phenomena and hence has been defined in several ways. A common definition 
of corruption as “abuse of public power for private gains or illegal benefits” is echoed in Osoba(1996), Eker 
(1981), Word Bank (1997) Treisman (2000), Sarkar and Hasan (2001), Akçay (2002), Hwang (2002), Svensson 
(2005),  Alt and Lassen (2003), Todaro and Smith (2003) and Buscaglia and Djik (2003) satisfies in part the 
objective of this study because corruption in Nigeria pervades all her socio-economic, private and political life . 
A more general definition is given by Eiras (2003) as ‘a form of unethical behavior and wrongdoing’. Unethical 
means a general consensus by the society of what is wrongdoing (Nwabuzor, 2005)).  And that means it is not 
only abuse of public power but all unethical actions that confers illegal benefit even in the private sector. What 
Smith and Smith (2010) describes as petty corruption and flaunts it that this has no place in the United States. He 
tags corruption as being used in discussions as a ‘Nigerian factor’.  Petty corruption involves the exchange of 
small amounts of money and granting of minor favors by those seeking preferential treatment (Lambert-
Mogiliansky, Majumdar and Radner, 2007), learnt by small government officials (Nwabuzor, 2005) from the 
untouchable small plutocrats (Osoba, 1996). In tackling this menace, all previous military governments had 
sworn to see to its end (Osoba, 1996) using legal means. The 2015 Buhari-led administration has 
internationalized the problem as a financial crime that inhibits national growth and inimical to global financial 
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stability. Despite these strategies, can it explain the atmosphere of economic insecurity being experienced in 
Nigeria? 
2.1 Theory of Corruption 
Why are we so concerned about the causes of corruption and how do economic institutions mitigate it? 
Corruption is bribery- the payment of money or in kind that is given or taken in a corrupt relationship (Wragg, 
Payne and Connor, 2009). Eker (1981) confines corruption to public life and contends that private corruption is 
not really classified as corruption but is rather labeled theft, fraud or embezzlement. Arslan and Saglam (2011) 
reiterate the existence of corruption in the private sector. Although, Eker argues very strongly on the necessary 
and sufficient conditions that make corruption to tick without any reference to the economic implication that 
corruption is a protection device against future need even though it is illegal. However, Osoba (1996) incisively 
connotes its investment function as being a tangible means of private accumulation in absence of other means in 
Nigeria. Smith and Smith (2010) consider the ‘inequality trap’ as the main factor that distinct Nigerian 
corruption from the rest of the world. A more realistic reason is that the criminal wants to raise some income and 
takes a risk (defined in Roumasset (1979a) as the probability that income will fall below a disaster level). This 
paper argues that as precautionary savings serve as insurance purpose that is well considered in literature so is 
corruption except for its illegal characteristics.  The causes of corruption were broadly divided into economic 
and non-economic in Shabbir and Anwar (2008). Listed as education, level of development, income distribution 
and economic freedom; except the last, they theoretically equate to determinants of demand for insurance. 
A large number of studies, Kunicova and Rose- Ackerman ( 2005), Lederman, et al (2005), Braun and Di Telia 
(2004), Chang and Golden (2004)  infer negative correlation between corruption and income. The Chairman of 
TI identifies poverty in a lecture series in Lagos (Werlin, 2005). Though, positive relations were recorded in 
some other studies like Brauna and Di Telia (2004). The consequences of corruption elaborately examined in 
Mauro (1995 and 1996) establish that corruption lowers private investment and economic growth because 
private investors are discouraged through increased cost of transaction. 
Within the same theoretical underpinnings, corruption can induce economic development by economic actors 
paying their way to by-pass inefficient rules and regulations. In essence, corruption reduces average income in 
the economy. It distorts the way government spends money thereby reducing the efficiency of health, 
educational, transport systems etc. by implication, it increases mortality rate, reduces literacy levels and arguably 
militates against insurance culture. In combating corruption, Osoba (1996) contends that in spite of its evils, the 
military government in 1983-1985 lost steam because of her anti social welfare behavior. Thus, the theory of 
corruption reduction could supposedly the promotion of economic security or inclusion 
 
2.2 Economics of Risk and Insurance 
Insurance provides risk management services (Ranade and Ahuja, 2000), against death, sickness accident, old 
age poverty, property loss and legal liabilities. Far back in time, it is seen as the business of human life under 
uncertainty. Relationally to income uncertainty, insurance is a mechanics by which risk-averse individuals 
transfer the fear of future uncertain event (Trowbridge, 1975). The word fear is used in this study instead of 
negative consequence to highlight its socio-psychological need just as corruption is social construct used as an 
accumulation function (Osoba, 1996). Hence, it is a financial planning instrument to smooth consumption shocks 
and address contingent needs. These risks are also referred to as life-cycle events. The risk-averse nature of 
human beings predisposes them to seek insurance or else, self-insurance in whatever form is activated ( Szpiro, 
1985 and Lee, 2010). Self-insurance is adopted in form of risk-budgeting for contingencies. This may induce 
petty corruption where income is inadequate to meet risk-budgeting or if there is no confidence in the insurance 
market. The construct is that risk management (insurance device) is the logical development and implementation 
of a plan to deal with potential losses (Dorfman, 2009). Since, there must be no vacuum in self-protection 
mechanism in nature; other means are innovated in the absence or low insurance take-up. Trowbridge (1989) 
provides the building blocks for this thinking in economics of risk. He deduces that the main reason for the 
establishment of security forces is to prevent whimsical criminal behaviour rather than the secondary reason 
which is enforcement. For the same reason the existence of financial security system of which insurance is one is 
to provide a risk management institutional framework for the society to reduce financial uncertainties. The 
financial security system is an economic inclusion mechanism which becomes effective by the access. 
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The history of pension, social insurance and compulsory life insurance for example in France following the 
example of Bismarck’s Germany is primarily to provide economic inclusion for the mass of workers blazing 
industrialization (Rubinow, 1911) and by implication insurance culture. Otherwise, workers may be alienated 
from risk-taking and economy suffers. The arguments for compulsory old age and life insurance which should 
have prompted insurance culture in Germany, France and the rest of Europe was used to promote social capital. 
It is arguably a plausible mechanism to hedge against petty corruption in Nigeria’s case. Okere, Lawrence and 
Njoku (2015) trace the reasons for increase in demand for insurance to employee agitation for improved welfare 
package. The basis for participating in micro-insurance were enumerated to be; basis risk, credit constraint, 
house-wealth, risk aversion and trust (Giesbert, Steiner, and Bendig, (2011) mentioned in Wang and Rosenman, 
2007; Gine, Townsend, and Vickery 2008; Cai et al., 2009; Cole et al., 2009; Thornton et al., 2010; Gine and 
Yang, 2009; Ito and Kono, 2010). On this account, Giesbert,  Steiner and Bendig, (2011) argue that insurance 
mechanism is either an alternative to savings and loans or are complementarities. In recognition of this, a low 
insurance uptake, credit constraint, poor house wealth (savings) may stimulate petty corruption. Poor insurance 
pricing and management on the part of insurers could also induce weak insurance behaviour or culture. 
The economics of insurance is its utility function in ministering to human welfare and by distributing the risks 
arising out of the uncertainty of human life bring about the highest attainable degree of economic security and 
aid in the equitable redistribution of wealth and the conservation of accumulated capital (Hoffman, 1911).  He 
also justified that life insurance unlike savings is an economic necessity of the prosperous otherwise, life 
uncertainties becomes higher.  
Theoretically, financial security systems increase personal economic security and economic inclusion 
(Trowbridge, 1989). Using Pareto efficiency, Seog (2010) demonstrates that insurance increases social welfare. 
In qualitative terms, it is deduced insurance gives economic confidence and peace of mind in risk-taking which 
is a path economic development. On this basis, Hopkins (2013) links reward seeking individuals to risk-taking 
behavior as the main source of risk. In the absence of adoption of insurance as economic protection instrument 
then, the risk management behavior is left open to other means in the economy. This may be the risk of the 
corruption rot prevalent in the Nigerian society. 
 
 2.3 Financial literacy, Insurance Culture and Financial inclusion 
Financial literacy means ability to understand and make use of financial concepts (Anguelov et al., 2004), also 
implies financial knowledge-ability to use financial information to take effective decisions. Education is 
presumed can help improve its level, although the effectiveness is not yet strong (LaBorde, Motter and Whalley, 
2013 cited in Lyons et al., 2006). By implication, financial knowledge is a critical determinant of life insurance 
consumption. In parallel terms, the supply of insurance in Nigeria is identified to be suffering huge knowledge 
gap (Daniel, 2015). 
 To understand insurance culture, the characteristics of Nigerian insurance market are further illustrated: 
Nigerian insurance market consist of 49 companies as at 2014 (compared with US market in 1860 with 47 
companies (Hoffman, 1911),  seven business classes of insurance serve only 1% of the population compared to 
South Africa’s 30% . This is attributable to poor insurance literacy or culture (CBN Report, 2012). Motor 
insurance produces the highest premium volume with 470, 000 policies and life insurance a distant second (173, 
000) attributable to compulsory nature of automobile and group life insurance (as at December, 2010). The 
industry focuses more on corporate products rather than retail insurance. The pensions market which was 
migrated from Defined Benefit (DB) to compulsory Defined Contributory (DC) Scheme in the Pension Reform 
(2004) characterized by the Chilean model, yet, cannot be said to be a financial inclusion mechanism. While the 
Nigerian Pension market is about 8% penetration after 10 years (Akpan and Ukpong, 2014), the Chilean 
penetration is 58.55% after 31 years. The staggering negative skewness of low insurance consumption portends 
poor financial literacy, insignificant economic inclusion and weak insurance culture. 
Insurance culture or insurance inclusiveness is a road map to financial inclusion. In CBN report (2012), access to 
insurance products is listed as a financial inclusion strategy. Even though the attention of financial inclusion is 
on accessibility to banking credit products (Dev, 2006), the relationship between savings, credit and insurance 
compels strategic focus on insurance management. The insurance mechanism could reduce the elements of 
corruption rot when the combination of life, health and pension insurance is maximized as security products. 
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Life insurance is a veritable tool for individual risk management against death and old age risks and is mainly 
used as a contractual savings instrument (Curak, DŽaja, and Pepur, 2013).  
 
The demand for life insurance as a means of life time allocation process is well considered in literature (Fisher, 
1973; Campbell, 1980; and Lewis, 1989). In this framework, the consumer maximizes lifetime utility 
(Outreville, 2014). Although, demand for insurance is conditioned by several other factors such as culture and 
religion (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982 mentioned in Houssels et al., 2005), income and education remain potent 
factors. Thus, any economic shock that drives income inequalities higher; lowers the quality of education and 
worsens mortality and life expectancy will negatively affect demand for life assurance. Succinctly hypothesized 
in Pӧrtner (2001) as risk-insurance; translated as, in a weak risk diversification system the need for insurance 
must be met by other means. It is expected that countries that are high on life insurance consumption have less 
incentives to be corrupt and vice-versa. 
 
 In theory the model of consumption/savings behavior demands a rational and farsighted life time consumption 
utility. The expected utility is the expected value of sum per-period utility discounted from over the working life. 
A well illustrated framework in Lusardi (2008) as “assets and consumption each period are determined 
endogenously by maximizing this utility function subject to any inter-temporal constraint, which represents the 
present discounted value of future resources (including earnings social security and pensions).” Any devolution 
risk of this expected utility might naturally predispose any one to petty corruption. Traditionally, this is handled 
by relying on families’ support and children as an insurance against life events in most parts of developing 
economies (Jensen, 1990 and Pӧrtner, 2001). According to Ogunshola (1984), Nigerian families depended on 
African traditional family consanguinities to manage individual and society risks. As educational realities 
breakdown these familial ties, this study argues that Nigerian households will be exposed to greater life risks that 
may prompt individuals to criminal tendencies such as corruption risk as a protective instrument. Corruption risk 
is here defined as the potential to assume petty corruption. A theoretical framework for decision making under 
uncertainty is explored to explain the possible connections of corruption to insurance culture. 
 
2.4 Theoretical Framework 
The risk-averse nature of human beings predisposes them to seek insurance or else, self-insurance in whatever 
form is activated (Schlesinger, 1981, Szpiro, 1985, Lee, 2010, and Seog, 2010). Self-insurance is adopted in 
form of risk-budgeting for contingencies. In a two state model, an increase in risk aversion attracts more self-
insurance. Increase in risk aversion can be brought about by poverty and low education (Kangoh, 2010). This 
may induce petty corruption where income is inadequate to meet risk-budgeting or if there is no confidence in 
the insurance market. Seog (2010) advances the insurance mechanism for social welfare and Pareto resource 
efficiency, claiming that by insurance context one could work directly with losses, instead of returns or wealth. 
Using the insurance principle in the risk allocation literature, it would be full-handy to conjecture an individual 
who is risk neutral and efficient (assumes others’ risk). For two individual- 1 representing risk neutral, while the 
other 2 strictly averse, a Pareto efficient allocation of risk, i.e. Y= (y1, y2) between these two would be best 
captured by this framework (Soeg, 2010: 40). 
Max (Y) EU1 (W1 ̶  y1 )                                    1 
s.t.EU2 (W2 ̶ y2) ≥ K; taking that y1 + y2 = z, for each realized (x1 x2), that is z = x1 + x2 
Imposing second constraint into the first, the program is simplified to solve for some K,  
max(Y) EU1(W1 ̶  y1 )                                    2 
such that EU2 (W2  ̶  z + y1) ≥ K 
Introducing the Lagrange function produces 
 
L=EU1 (W1   ̶  y1) +λ[EU2   ̶  z + y1) ̶  K ],                                              3 
In this context, an efficient allocation should satisfy the following: 
 
0)()( 12'111'11 =+−+−Ε= yzWUyWULy λ                                   4 
For each ),( 21 xx  the following relationship holds:  
=> )(' 111 yWU −=λ / )(' 122 yzWU +−                                                 5 
 
Equation 5 indicates that the marginal utility of individual 2 is constant in all states as follows: 
,/1)( 12'2 λ=+− yzWU for every ),( 21 xx  
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 Implying that wealth is same across ),( 21 xx , since individual 2 is risk averse. Thus, since z  represents total 
loss which is risky, and upon individual 1 being risk neutral, individual 2 faces no risk; all risk is assumed by 
individual 1 under a Pareto efficiency allocation arrangement. The risk transfer arrangement thus benefits both 
parties. 
 
3. Methodology and Data 
Being an exploratory and empirical study, we attempt to obtain the maximum information on the short and long–
run relationships that may promote economic inclusion, through the variables associated with incidence of 
corruption in Nigeria. These are life insurance penetration (Lip), financial literacy (Flt), regulatory quality (Rqt), 
income inequality (Gini coefficient) and income growth (Gdprt). Granger causality technique and Variance 
autoregression (VAR) are applied. 
Model Specification 
In general, a structural Granger VAR model with k-lag can be of the compact form: 
tit
K
i it
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−
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Where: Vt = Ci, Gini, Rqt, Lip, Gdpgr,Flt;  C is coefficient of matrix the 6 x 6; tµ  is vector of residuals of the 
reduced form equations. Vt stands for vector of variables. The Granger Variance autocorrelation model is 
patterned after Kammoun (2010) and specified explicitly as follows: 
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Where: ξψφδθ and,,,,  are unknown parameters; α is constant term; µ  is the residual for each equation. 
Both iα  and iµ  are N x 1 vectors. 
Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 Data for 34 years (1980-2013) were sourced from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and the Central Bank 
of Nigeria (CBN) Statistical Bulletin. The data for gross domestic product growth rate (Gdpgr) is obtained from 
NBS. Life Insurance Penetration ( Lip ) is computed from data obtained from Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 
statistical bulletin and National Insurance Commission of Nigeria (NAICOM). Data on corruption index (Ci) is 
sourced from Transparency International (TI) organization. The TI index sums up the perceptions of the degree 
of corruption as seen by business people and country analyst, and range between zero (0) representing highest 
corrupt, and ten (10), which is very clean (Transparency International, 2014). Financial literacy ( Flt ) represents 
literacy rate was obtained from the National Bureau of Statistic (NBS). Regulatory quality ( Rqt ) represents 
financial regulatory standard index for Nigeria institutions obtained from World Governance Institute (WGI, 
2013) Report. The Regulatory index is organized by the World Bank experts annually for global governance 
rating of each nation’s institutions regulatory quality ranked from -0.25(lowest score) to +2.5 (highest score).  
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 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics of the set of data within the study period in context provides an overview of the 
behavior of the variables. The highest incidence of corruption occurred in 2012 while the lowest was in 1980 and 
1981. It indicates that incidence of corruption has been on an increasing trend in Nigeria. Financial literacy’s 
highest rating occurred in 2013 with 62% of adult Nigerians, while the least occurred in 1983. The growth rate in 
Gdp has its highest achievement in 2004 while the least growth rate was occurred in 1981. On level of income 
inequality (Gini co-efficient), the nation’s highest rating occurred in years 1997-2003 , while the lowest is 2012. 
Life insurance penetration (Lip) has the highest record in 1983 while the lowest performance occurred in 1995; 
an indication that demand for life insurance is not correlating with the pattern of population, literacy and 
economic growth. Regulatory quality has its highest rating in 1985 while the lowest is in 1994.  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics  
 LCI LGINI LFLT LLIP RQT GDPGR 
 Mean  0.314508  3.527675  3.979450 -2.106326 -1.187353  3.756471 
 Median  0.222343  3.777348  3.998159 -2.107849 -0.820000  4.525000 
 Maximum  0.993252  3.923952  4.127134 -1.347074 -0.200000  10.60000 
 Minimum -0.356675 -0.717440  3.806662 -3.055482 -8.430000 -13.30000 
 Std. Dev.  0.391041  1.078967  0.081813  0.392860  1.372464  4.937615 
 Skewness  0.193193 -3.693717 -0.400908 -0.159950 -4.520501 -1.311298 
 Kurtosis  2.101277  14.79965  2.396676  2.913172  24.27953  5.568542 
       
 Jarque-Bera  1.355745  274.5585  1.426456  0.155657  757.2904  19.09018 
 Probability  0.507696  0.000000  0.490060  0.925123  0.000000  0.000072 
       
 Sum  10.69327  119.9409  135.3013 -71.61510 -40.37000  127.7200 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  5.046138  38.41760  0.220879  5.093182  62.16066  804.5414 
       
 Observations  34  34  34  34  34  34 
 
Unit Root Test: Unit root test (see table 5) examines each variable’s trending characteristics. All variables 
exhibit trending behavior but subsequently became stationary at first difference I(1). By transforming the 
variables and subsequent test for stationarity, it could produce I(0), particularly the stochastic error et (Asteriou 
and Hall, 2011). The cointegration (linear combinations) ( see table 4) test gave more than one linear 
combinations, an indication for long run study and forecasting possibility (Hill et al., 2011). 
Table 2: Unit root table 
Variables ADF test: Level & 
First difference 
(Intercept and Trend) 
Remark: Order of 
integration  
% Level of 
Significance 
lCi 
Flt 
Gdpgr 
lGini 
Rqt 
lLip 
-5.164479 
-7.038538 
-7.830062 
-6.114396 
-6.658251 
-7.259483 
I(1) 
I(1) 
I(1) 
I(1) 
I(1) 
I(1) 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Source: Authors’ estimation using E-view 7.0; MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-value. 
Note: the variable’s critical values at 1 and 5 percents are -4.273277 and -3.557759 respectively. 
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4. Results and Discussion of Findings 
Granger Test:  
Granger (1969) examines short run predictive influence on variable y by a predetermined variable x. Asteriou 
and Hall (2011) state that the standard test results in the relationship would be of four outcomes: bidirectional; 
unidirectional- pairwise; and no-causality. The outcome herewith (see table 3 below) at 5% significant level 
produces unidirectional granger causality as  follows -corruption index (Ci) ‘granger cause’ financial 
literacy(Flt); Ci ‘granger cause’ Gdp growth rate(gdpgr); Rqt ‘granger causes’ Lip. At 10%, Ci ‘granger causes’ 
income inequality (gini), and Flt ‘granger causes’ Gdpgr. 
Examining the predetermined influence of Ci on financial literacy encapsulated in the granger result makes it 
apt, that corruption as an anti-development agent (Furphy, 2010) retards socio-economic progress, giving the 
cost on the nation’s resources, which would have been invested in advancing literacy. To the World Bank 
(2010), incidence of low level of corruption, which the bank regards as “quiet corruption” is prevalent in many 
African government -run education, health and agricultural services, damaging the long term education of the 
very poor and vulnerable, who mostly rely on government services. 
Corruption also granger-causing Gdpgr indicate that corruption has the tendency of denying the economy 
legitimate investment and development opportunities, alienating the poor and hence widening the nation’s 
income gap. Todaro and Smith (2011) reveal that reduction in corruption encourages investments and “effort to 
expand the pie” rather than its distribution, which also leads to growth.  
Regulatory quality (rqt) granger causing life insurance penetration is in relation to the supply of regulatory 
standards for insurance management which should boost insurance demands. The quality of insurance is 
determined by the nature of price, solvency and market conduct regulations as it informs the soundness and 
safety of the industry. 
Ci granger causing Gini indicates reinforces the literature that a potent cause of rising inequality in less 
developed countries is rising evidence of corruption. . Gupta et al. (2002) found that high corruption correlate 
with high income inequality and poverty as corruption is found to reduce social service meant for the poor.  
Smith and Smith (2010) suggest the distinguishing factor of Nigerian-type corruption from the rest of the world 
is the ‘inequality trap’.  
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 08/29/15   Time: 20:44 
Sample: 1980 2013  
Lags: 1   
    
    
 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
    
 LGINI does not Granger Cause LCI  33  0.34112 0.5635 
 LCI does not Granger Cause LGINI  3.33892 0.0776 
    
    
 LFLT does not Granger Cause LCI  33  0.54205 0.4673 
 LCI does not Granger Cause LFLT  4.10384 0.0518 
    
    
 GDPGR does not Granger Cause LCI  33  0.03925 0.8443 
 LCI does not Granger Cause GDPGR  7.52610 0.0102 
    
    
    
 GDPGR does not Granger Cause LFLT  33  0.41387 0.5249 
 LFLT does not Granger Cause GDPGR  3.02830 0.0921 
    
    
 RQT does not Granger Cause LLIP  33  14.8815 0.0006 
 LLIP does not Granger Cause RQT  0.29074 0.5937 
    
    Source: Author’s estimation using Eview 7.0 
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Cointegration 
Having established that the variables are stationary at I(1), cointegration  test becomes necessary. The 
cointegration test below reveals 4 ranks in the trace and eigen values criteria respectively (see table 7 below), 
suggesting that the model variables are eligible for combination in a long term relationship test. 
Table 4: Cointegration Rank Test  
Date: 08/27/15   Time: 16:58   
Sample (adjusted): 1983 2013   
Included observations: 31 after adjustments  
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend  
Series: CI FLT GDPGR HDI LIP RQT UMP    
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 2  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None *  0.979635  293.5605  125.6154  0.0000 
At most 1 *  0.906743  172.8479  95.75366  0.0000 
At most 2 *  0.779062  99.30349  69.81889  0.0000 
At most 3 *  0.595215  52.49743  47.85613  0.0172 
At most 4  0.414891  24.46109  29.79707  0.1816 
At most 5  0.218325  7.846443  15.49471  0.4820 
At most 6  0.006771  0.210626  3.841466  0.6463 
     
     
 Trace test indicates 4 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
     
     Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None *  0.979635  120.7126  46.23142  0.0000 
At most 1 *  0.906743  73.54444  40.07757  0.0000 
At most 2 *  0.779062  46.80605  33.87687  0.0009 
At most 3 *  0.595215  28.03634  27.58434  0.0438 
At most 4  0.414891  16.61465  21.13162  0.1910 
At most 5  0.218325  7.635817  14.26460  0.4169 
At most 6  0.006771  0.210626  3.841466  0.6463 
     
     
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 4 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
 
  
Vector Error Correction Term 
Upon achieving cointegrating status with differenced stationary variables, it is imperative that the error 
correction term be established for long run equilibrium. Error correction mechanism reflects the current “error” 
in achieving long-run equilibrium. Otherwise called the disequilibrium response, as presented in table 5 below, it 
posses the standard adjustment negative sign (-0.003). It suggests that 0.3% disequilibrium in the short run 
dynamics model is adjustable for long run equilibrium.   
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 Table 5: Vector Error Correction 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates     
 Date: 09/13/15   Time: 05:37     
 Sample (adjusted): 1982 2013     
 Included observations: 32 after adjustments    
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]    
       
       Error Correction: D(LCI) D(LGINI) D(FLT) D(LLIP) D(RQT) D(GDPGR) 
       
       CointEq1 -0.003081  0.051077 -0.173495  0.076908 -0.136539  0.691449 
  (0.01175)  (0.09057)  (0.27352)  (0.01880)  (0.17427)  (0.42968) 
 [-0.26222] [ 0.56393] [-0.63430] [ 4.09090] [-0.78350] [ 1.60920] 
 
Variance Decomposition test 
The Variance Decomposition (VD) is a forecast error decomposition process, which provides the amount of 
information each variable contributes to the other variables error in the autoregression system. In other words, it 
determines how much of the forecast error variance of each of the variables can be explained given exogenous 
shocks of other variables in the VAR system, through the immediate, short to long run periods. From table 5 
below, corruption index (Ci)’s standard error (SE) in the immediate and short run periods (0-3 years) is 
attributed to itself and Rqt. In the medium term to long term periods Income inequality (Gini) assumes the 
dominant contributor to the variance. It suggests that the corruption issues are basically influence by poor 
regulatory issues in the short run, while income inequality assumes dominant factor in subsequent periods. 
In examining income inequality (Gini) variance in the period, it is also evident that though a higher percentage is 
due to itself, the next attributable is corruption index (Ci), and on a smaller scale life insurance penetration. This 
implies that aside from the income gap being due to the characteristics or behavior of the variable, Ci has its 
impact on accentuating income inequality.   
 The variance for financial literacy (Flt) is more attributed to Gini and corruption index from the short to long 
period analysis, while the immediate period’s variance is self induced. The variance of life insurance penetration 
is largely absorbed in the immediate and short term by self and regulatory quality (Rqt), while in the medium to 
long term periods Gini absorbed the largest error, with small percentage due to Ci.  
The Gdp growth rate’s variance decomposition is largely absorbed by Gini from short to long term periods. The 
immediate period variance is attributed and shared between the Gdp, Rqt and life insurance. In the very long run 
Ci becomes more pronounced in the Gdpgr error forecast. This paper here recalls Rose-Ackerman (2008) work 
that irrespective of the prescriptions of macroeconomists, where a country’s private and public institutions are 
very corrupt and dysfunctional, it will never succeed in promoting growth, albeit inclusive one.             
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Table 6: Variance Decomposition  
        
        
 Varian
ce 
Decom
position 
of  
LCI:        
 Period S.E. LCI LGINI LFLT LLIP RQT GDPGR 
        
        
 1  0.124194  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.189682  91.04899  0.518866  1.676663  0.029598  6.679196  0.046689 
 3  0.287907  63.08945  30.30751  1.273874  0.660800  3.772712  0.895655 
 4  0.633176  26.17861  71.86359  0.370790  0.145782  1.128828  0.312393 
 5  1.103026  18.98711  79.21286  0.757008  0.464601  0.430088  0.148334 
 6  1.873723  15.56420  82.19878  0.978577  0.909215  0.278552  0.070680 
 7  2.822523  15.84526  81.00857  1.149330  1.556024  0.408690  0.032128 
 8  4.204112  16.14440  80.24256  1.075932  1.933443  0.589154  0.014506 
 9  6.205247  16.60084  79.51218  0.958531  2.109574  0.809331  0.009543 
 10  9.360474  16.53491  79.65000  0.831622  2.077937  0.896755  0.008779 
        
        
 Varian
ce 
Decom
position 
of 
LGINI:        
 Period S.E. LCI LGINI LFLT LLIP RQT GDPGR 
        
        
 1  0.922094  2.796455  97.20354  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  1.196469  6.597653  91.05204  1.104622  1.195308  0.002906  0.047470 
 3  2.205037  7.625877  90.13808  0.947420  1.226789  0.047363  0.014469 
 4  3.017540  11.34362  84.70526  1.334742  2.184229  0.396723  0.035427 
 5  4.497262  12.96960  83.05704  1.102316  2.329484  0.521075  0.020479 
 6  6.499421  14.88559  80.84134  0.979291  2.398539  0.868261  0.026976 
 7  9.836896  15.42066  80.63189  0.815692  2.215029  0.895529  0.021198 
 8  15.24359  15.45281  80.90027  0.744810  1.995899  0.888093  0.018113 
 9  23.94549  15.26382  81.30453  0.736964  1.873075  0.807258  0.014353 
 10  37.78944  15.07274  81.59609  0.756975  1.814247  0.748345  0.011606 
        
        
 Varian
ce 
Decom
position 
of 
LFLT:        
 Period S.E. LCI LGINI LFLT LLIP RQT GDPGR 
        
        
 1  0.048046  0.830599  6.415139  92.75426  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.056081  4.443848  11.42205  82.10305  1.615803  0.004102  0.411151 
 3  0.214370  1.989778  91.29526  5.673748  0.117675  0.846694  0.076840 
 4  0.317794  4.661342  90.41741  3.275090  1.111629  0.397876  0.136655 
 5  0.623061  6.387452  90.78441  1.487206  1.147003  0.148538  0.045394 
 6  0.910739  9.778945  86.29738  1.547068  2.005920  0.312106  0.058576 
 7  1.390258  11.71762  84.36329  1.251464  2.212602  0.420132  0.034888 
 8  2.035949  13.83121  81.96419  1.096237  2.359734  0.714064  0.034565 
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 9  3.069667  14.82259  81.17857  0.908143  2.254669  0.809822  0.026204 
 10  4.715303  15.23070  81.01529  0.801661  2.073285  0.857686  0.021382 
        
        
 Varian
ce 
Decom
position 
of 
LLIP:        
 Period S.E. LCI LGINI LFLT LLIP RQT GDPGR 
        
        
 1  0.191165  0.249657  5.916396  4.891820  88.94213  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.270255  2.210491  8.946722  2.817059  54.48035  30.10075  1.444634 
 3  0.466538  2.936754  55.37065  2.187053  22.37749  13.97947  3.148589 
 4  0.502939  3.191178  53.01498  5.480907  19.29326  14.80700  4.212674 
 5  0.569940  2.754394  58.68148  4.981818  15.04087  13.19009  5.351343 
 6  1.269710  3.555376  88.34791  1.075422  3.139451  2.657971  1.223873 
 7  2.327039  6.315524  89.94793  1.010130  1.488874  0.817852  0.419692 
 8  3.922122  8.620879  88.18051  1.194781  1.519172  0.327472  0.157183 
 9  6.033849  10.99564  85.43093  1.287481  1.879514  0.332264  0.074170 
 10  8.908023  13.13155  82.90025  1.216590  2.211287  0.498755  0.041567 
        
        
 Varian
ce 
Decom
position 
of 
RQT:        
 Period S.E. LCI LGINI LFLT LLIP RQT GDPGR 
        
        
 1  1.667376  0.022731  0.022027  0.013408  2.303964  97.63787  0.000000 
 2  1.681558  0.025387  0.027299  0.338248  2.316696  96.68893  0.603438 
 3  3.024782  4.052742  63.84300  0.104617  0.814103  30.53875  0.646784 
 4  4.110609  7.758740  73.44977  0.505091  1.223526  16.59037  0.472495 
 5  8.108804  8.242553  85.87626  0.612062  0.821015  4.324289  0.123819 
 6  12.16974  11.25115  83.98257  1.070340  1.502983  2.120378  0.072581 
 7  19.12950  12.44947  83.63326  1.047837  1.761218  1.077236  0.030974 
 8  28.35546  14.20152  81.75136  1.045467  2.049998  0.929296  0.022352 
 9  42.68174  15.07286  80.99913  0.929838  2.118141  0.864371  0.015661 
 10  64.94228  15.51173  80.69655  0.837422  2.055960  0.884153  0.014186 
        
        
 Varian
ce 
Decom
position 
of 
GDPG
R:        
 Period S.E. LCI LGINI LFLT LLIP RQT GDPGR 
        
        
 1  3.758345  1.214201  2.378168  4.778062  8.682902  6.573313  76.37335 
 2  4.126075  10.72153  3.939001  3.979118  11.37122  6.179787  63.80935 
 3  9.927627  2.347218  81.92946  0.919302  2.362416  1.115406  11.32620 
 4  11.45080  4.672483  79.58692  2.280185  3.381708  1.105740  8.972960 
 5  19.91584  5.629892  87.93988  1.433354  1.650196  0.378578  2.968102 
 6  25.28069  9.834509  83.43331  1.898914  2.426146  0.520418  1.886699 
 7  35.60995  12.17884  82.35576  1.492301  2.551409  0.470105  0.951591 
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 8  48.98383  14.86245  79.84834  1.237982  2.609071  0.923612  0.518546 
 9  71.26702  15.93978  79.46174  0.939829  2.421219  0.984396  0.253043 
 10  108.9149  15.93242  80.12076  0.766602  2.076444  0.986824  0.116948 
        
        
 Choles
ky 
Orderin
g: LCI 
LGINI 
LFLT 
LLIP 
RQT 
GDPG
R        
        
        
 
4. Discussion of Result 
The Granger causality and the Variance decomposition tests unveil the claim that corruption is like cancer as it is 
found to significantly influence education (a proxy for financial literacy), income inequality, national income 
growth in the short run study but to a lesser extent income inequality, financial literacy, life insurance 
penetration , regulatory quality, and  income growth in the long run. Regulations granger- predicts the poor level 
of life insurance. Likewise, VAR shows vividly the greatest source of influence against life insurance penetration 
in the medium to long-run as income inequality, and to lesser extent corruption  which the Nigerian theory of 
corruption is premised of in Smith and Smith (2010) ‘equality trap’. The short-run influence came from poor 
regulatory quality. The income inequality is attributable more to self, then to corruption and a lesser extent life 
insurance and financial literacy. In fact, the VAR result shows glaringly that income inequality crises permeates 
all other variables by about 85% through the short to long run forecast, an issue which the Nigerian State must 
urgently address.  However, the study hypothesizes that the lack of insurance culture through high demand of life 
insurance influences the significant prevalence of corruption. It is evident this relationship is not clearly proven 
except in the very long run, and from the theoretical perspective. This may be so if demand for insurance in 
Nigeria is more connected to factors like religion and culture as found in related literature. 
4.1 Recommendations 
In the light of the findings of this study and extant literature on corruption and economic efficiency on one hand 
and utility of insurance as income uncertainty protection mechanism on the other, the study suggests insurance-
based solution to drive economic and financial inclusion and reduction of petty corruption. As a first step, 
insurance companies must be developed with the concept of socio-economic institution with low probabilities of 
market failure from regulatory quality. Corporate governance of insurance companies should urgently establish 
who is a ‘fit and proper person’ to be the CEO and Board of Directors of insurance and pension companies.  In 
addition stiffer penalties that are already put forward in Pension reform (2014) is suggested for insurance 
managers. In line with Dodd-Frank Act of the US Securities and Exchange Commission, insurance contract 
should be made to disclose all information at the point of purchase decisions and not to avoid claims payment on 
flimsy non-compliance by insured. Financial literacy and insurance education should be integrated to all tertiary 
level education to drive home the need for financial planning early in life. Income inequalities and poverty 
reduction should aggressively be addressed. A social insurance package must be designed at the state level for 
the poor through taxation. The Nigerian financial sector needs urgent reforms that engender financial inclusion 
and insurance culture to institutionally tackle corruption apart from the commendable legal and ethical war.  
5. Conclusion 
Income inequality regulatory quality and financial literacy was found to influence corruption to a good extent. 
The result is surprisingly not supportive of the economics of insurance that predicts that demand is influenced by 
income inequality and financial literacy in the immediate and short run, but it is highly supportive of theory in 
the long run for income inequality. Regulations had greater correlation to life insurance as a proxy for insurance 
culture. Since extant literature establishes that the same factor as this is found to influence corruption, it affirms 
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the existing understanding on corruption risk. In the same vein the conjecture that if these factors influence 
corruption and weaken demand of life insurance; corruption indirectly will negatively be related to its utility. 
The attempt of the study give an exploratory and empirical light to the use of corruption as an accumulation 
(Osoba, 1996) or saving function, or insurance function needs to be further explored in further research as this is 
not yet tested. 
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